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Until recently, I served as Under Secretary of Enforcement at the Treasury
Department. I do not know how many of you are familiar with that particular
office and its responsibilities, but they are quite broad and diverse in coverage.
As Under Secretary of Enforcement, I was responsible for overseeing the U.S.
Custom Service; the U.S. Secret Service; the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and
Firearms; the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, which obviously does
intersect quite closely and regularly with the financial community; and the Office
of Foreign Assets Control.
I was sworn into office in August 2001, a month before September 11 th. I
assumed the responsibilities as Under Secretary of Enforcement with a very
different set of objectives in mind, vis-A-vis, what I spent the last year and a half
doing. I assumed my new duties believing that I would be focusing my time and
attention largely on anti-money laundering because I had an interest in the area
for quite an extensive period of time, going back to my days as a federal
prosecutor in Los Angeles. Within the Enforcement Office, I established a
section on money laundering and financial crimes. There was no such office prior
to my assuming the position as Under Secretary. I was also very interested in
terrorism, and I was concerned about the lack of a coordinated response within
the Treasury law enforcement agencies. I established an office on Terrorism and
Violent Crime that was put in place prior to September 11 th.
On September 11, 2001, the President returned to Washington, D.C. from his
trip to Florida to address the Nation and declare war against A1-Qaeda and
terrorism. There are two points in his remarks that struck me. First, he stated that
this would be an unconventional war fought on multiple fronts, beyond merely
the military front. He also stated that this would be a long-term effort and
undertaking. He said victory would not be declared in months but in years, and
that this was an effort we would be engaged in for the foreseeable future and
perhaps one that even our children would witness.
On September 24, 2001, I was at the White House when the President
announced the signing of Executive Order 13224. In his remarks, he stated,
We will direct every resource at our command to win the war against
terrorists, every means of diplomacy, every tool of intelligence, every
instrument of law enforcement, every financial influence. We will starve
the terrorists of funding.
The President directed Treasury Secretary Paul O'Neill to lead the Nation's
war against the financing of global terrorism.
In my remarks this morning, I would like to pose four very basic and
fundamental questions with respect to the U.S. Government's strategy against
* Former Under Secretary for Enforcement, U.S. Department of Treasury and former Professor of Law
at Notre Dame University.
2004 / Panel One: Unfunding Terror
terrorist financing and attempt to answer those questions. First, why have a
counter-terrorist financing strategy? Why go after the money? As you know, the
critics maintain that terrorist acts are cheaply financed. After all, how much
money does it cost for an individual to strap explosives to his person, walk into
an open market, detonate them and cause the death and destruction of dozens of
innocent civilian lives? Second, what is the goal; what is the purpose of the U.S.
Government's strategy; and, what is the ultimate objective? Third, what is the
strategy; what are its various components? Finally, has the strategy been
successful; what are the results and how do we measure success?
Let me begin with the first question, why go after the money? It is very simple.
Terrorists need money to finance training, to recruit members to the Al-Qaeda cause,
to support global travel, to support and sustain global communications, to purchase
instruments of terror, including biochemical and other weapons of mass destruction,
and to sustain and support terrorist cells. As you know, Al-Qaeda has sleeper cells in
as many as sixty countries throughout the world. Further, we have to keep in mind
that Al-Qaeda's ambitions are global. This terrorist organization has its sights set not
only on targets in the United States but the Middle East, Southeast Asia and Eastern
Europe. Specifically, I am referring to Indonesia, as we have seen most recently with
the terrorist attacks in Bali, Indonesia, as well as the Philippines.
Second, with respect to the goal and the purpose of the government's terrorist
financial strategy, it is preventative in nature. Clearly, after September 11 th the
focus changed. It is no longer enough to bring to justice the perpetrators of
terrorist crimes. Instead, the goal must be to prevent terrorist attacks that kill
innocent people. As you know, the terrorist attacks of September 11 th resulted in
the killing of approximately three thousand people. Therefore, it is not enough to
merely prosecute the perpetrator of such heinous acts after the fact. The United
States strategy intends to identify, disrupt, and dismantle the financial infrastructure
of Al-Qaeda, to make it more difficult and more risky to raise money and to
transfer money globally. Additionally, the goal is to shut off global access to
financial institutions to organizations and make it impossible for Al-Qaeda
sympathizers to move money through traditional banking systems.
Next, what is the strategy? It has multiple components. I want to focus
principally on the blocking and designation components. On September 11 th,
there was no comprehensive, coordinated strategy to deprive terrorists of funds.
While some efforts had been undertaken during the Clinton Administration with
Executive Orders and U.N. Security Council Resolutions, I think it is fair to say
that it was not a priority for the Clinton Administration. Obviously, immediately
following September 11 th there was a heightened sense of urgency to respond to
the terrorist attacks and prevent future acts of terrorism. The President wanted
action quickly and decisively. The components of this strategy were pieced
together in September and October of 2001. The first major component involved
signing Executive Order 13224, which authorized the blocking and freezing of
terrorist bank accounts. In late September 2001, the United Nations adopted U.N.
Security Council Resolution 1373, which requires member states to block
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terrorist funds "without delay." Additionally, in October 2001, the Financial
Action Task Force ("FATF") was enlisted to assist in these anti-terrorist
financing efforts. Towards the end of October 2001, an extra plenary session of
FATF was held in Washington D.C. to determine how to leverage the resources
of this important international organization to focus on both anti-money
laundering and terrorist financing. Finally, in October 2001, President Bush
signed into law the USA PATRIOT Act. It is the most significant legislation
dealing with money laundering since the enactment of the Money Laundering
Act of 1986. So we moved quickly, decisively, and on multiple fronts to combat
the funding of terror.
President Bush included in Executive Order 13224 the powers given him under
the International Economic Emergency Powers Act ("IEEPA"), which authorizes
blocking and freezing bank accounts of foreign nationals and foreign entities located
in the United States, where there is reason to believe the funds are being used to
finance terror. Acting under Executive Order 13224, the U.S. Treasury Department
designated twenty-seven individuals, entities, and organizations as terrorist
financiers. The Office of Foreign Assets Control ("OFAC") published these names
on their website requiring financial institutions in the United States to determine
whether or not they had any accounts in the names of these twenty-seven individuals
and entities. If so, the financial institutions were mandated to take action to block and
freeze those accounts. These individuals were denied the ability to do business in the
United States. Since September 24, 2001, the list has expanded to include over two
hundred sixty names resulting in $125 million being frozen, domestically and
internationally.
Next, I would like to address the international implementation of this
strategy. To be effective, the effort to deprive terrorists of funds must be global in
nature. The challenge was to develop and implement a strategy of global reach.
How do you cause foreign financial institutions to take actions simultaneously
with the United States?
The vehicle for accomplishing this goal was U.N. Security Council Resolution
1373. This resolution mandates that member states prevent and suppress the
financing of terrorist acts, prevent the provision and collection of funds for
terrorist use, and block, without delay, funds and other financial assets and
economic resources of terrorists and their supporters. Now that we had domestic
and international authority to block terrorist funds, it was necessary to put in
place a process that bridged these two important authorities.
The process developed was relatively simple. An inter-agency group was
established consisting of representatives from the Treasury Department, the
Department of Justice, the FBI, Customs Service, the CIA, the National Security
Council, and other relevant federal law enforcement agencies. The Office of
Foreign Assets Control was tasked with analyzing public-source information as
well as other evidence to identify individuals that are part of the Al-Qaeda
financial network. Individuals determined to be part of the Al-Qaeda network,
sympathetic to the Al-Qaeda cause, or raising money to support Al-Qaeda were
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added to the Treasury Department's list of assets to be blocked. The inter-agency
group would meet to discuss the proposed names, review the evidence and
discuss other policy considerations. For example, if the Department of Justice
and the FBI had an ongoing criminal investigation, to publicly designate the
name of the individual could have a disruptive effect and undermine the
investigation. We were constantly working to resolve competing interests and
reach unanimity on the action to be taken.
The next challenge involved developing a process to facilitate international
cooperation and ensure that the international community was moving in tandem with
the Treasury Department's blocking actions. We developed this process in
conjunction with the U.N. Sanctions Committee, the international body responsible
for implementing U.N. Security Council Resolution 1373. Under the procedures
developed, the U.N. Sanctions Committee would be notified of the Treasury
Departments intention to add someone to the U.S. list. The names of those
individuals and entities would be forwarded to the Sanctions Committee forty-eight
hours in advance of public designation. If no member of the U.N. Sanctions
Committee objected, then the name or names would be added to the U.N. Sanctions
Committee list. Once a name was added to the international list of financiers, all of
the members of the United Nations were obligated, as a matter of international law,
to take action to block the accounts and assets, without delay. Member States would
then send out notices to their domestic financial institutions to block the assets of
individuals on the international list. Of the $125 million that has been blocked since
September 24, 2001, approximately $80 million have been blocked internationally.
To highlight what I consider to be unprecedented international cooperation,
let me cite a couple of examples. First, with respect to the Saudis, it has been a
battle, but we are making progress. On March 11, 2003, the United States and
Saudi Arabia jointly designated the Somalia and the Bosnia Herzegovina
branches of a Saudi based charity, Al-Harmain, because the Islamic charity was
supporting Al-Qaeda. The headquarters of Al-Harmain are located in Saudi Arabia.
On September 9, 2002, the United States and Saudi Arabia jointly designated Wael
Hamza Julaiden, an associate of Osama bin Laden, and supporter of Al-Qaeda. Most
recently, the Saudi government publicly acknowledged that they have a problem
regulating the movement of money through charities. To address this problem,
the Saudis have established an oversight commission to impose regulations on
and enhance the transparency of Saudi charities. However, the challenge for the
Saudis is to make sure that its oversight commission follows through with its
stated objectives.
Another example of international cooperation involves the G-7 Nations. On
April 19, 2002, the G-7 Nations took action to block ten supporters and
financiers of terror. Additionally, in August 2002, the United States and Italy
designated eleven individuals and fourteen entities as financiers of terror. Most
recently, in response to the attacks in Bali, Indonesia, the United States and
approximately fifty of its allies took action against Jamaah Islamia, a terrorist
organization in Southeast Asia.
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The success of the strategy has been difficult to measure. There is no way of
knowing with any degree of certainty how many millions of dollars or hundreds
of millions of dollars are available globally to support terror. Therefore, it is
difficult to determine whether the $125 million in terrorist assets frozen to date
represents a significant percent of available assets. At the very least, it is
reasonable to say that the anti-terrorist, anti-financing strategy has prevented
$125 million from going to terrorists to finance and underwrite future acts of
terrorism. That is particularly significant because we know that the terrorist
attacks of September 11 th cost between $300,000 and $500,000. So the amount
of money frozen to date is significant.
It must be emphasized that the terrorist financing strategy is preventative in
nature. While the amount of money blocked is important, it does not tell the whole
story. In some cases, the action taken has resulted in dismantling entire global
financial networks. For example, U.S. action resulted in blocking over $1 million in
terror related funds from passing through A1-Barakaat, a-Hawala or alternative
remittent systems. However, A1-Barakaat was believed to be funneling as much as
$60 million a year to support terror. So, the fact that we blocked $1 million in
terrorist related assets does not accurately reflect the impact of those efforts, because
a financial channel moving upwards of $60 million a year was dismantled. As the
result, A1-Qaeda has been forced to find alternative means for moving money
globally. Al-Qaeda is a very resilient and adaptable organization. While U.S. efforts
have made it more difficult and more risky for Al-Qaeda to move money through
traditional banks, it is seeking non-traditional means of moving money. Additionally,
the anti-terrorist financing strategy has had a deterrent effect. Individuals are now
less willing and reluctant to donate money to AI-Qaeda and other terrorist
organizations for fear that their names will be added to the U.S. list of terrorist
financiers, and their bank accounts will be frozen in the United States and abroad.
One last point that I would like to comment on is the USA PATRIOT Act.
The USA PATRIOT Act was signed into law on October 26, 2001. The USA
PATRIOT Act has had an impact on financial institutions, both domestically and
internationally. Let me just touch on a couple of the key financial provisions.
Section 313 prohibits U.S. banks from maintaining correspondent accounts for
foreign shell banks with no physical presence in any country. Section 313 also
requires financial institutions to take reasonable steps to ensure that foreign
banks with correspondent accounts do not themselves maintain correspondent
accounts for shell banks.
Additionally, Section 326 requires U.S. banks to issue regulations establishing
minimum standards for identification of customers opening new accounts, the "Know
Your Customer Rule." Moreover, Section 352 requires all financial institutions to
develop an anti-money laundering program, as well as assign a person to monitor the
implementation of the program. That person is also responsible for ensuring that
employees are trained to identify suspicious transactions that may be suggestive of
money laundering.
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Finally, Section 356 requires securities brokers and dealers to report
suspicious transactions. This provision extends the suspicious activity reporting
requirements to securities brokers and dealers. These are just a few of the key
provisions of the USA PATRIOT Act intended to prevent money laundering and
deny terrorist supporters access to the system banking system.
One of the current challenges is to maintain the sense of urgency with our
international allies that existed immediately following September 11 th. My fear
is that this sense of urgency is waning, that our allies have become preoccupied
with other issues and priorities, and therefore are less committed to supporting
our anti-terrorist financing efforts. Finally, the federal government needs to do a
better job of coordinating its interagency response to terrorist financing. This
includes efforts to enhance information sharing between the Department of
Justice, Department of Treasury, the CIA, and other agencies. Once again, thank
you for the invitation and the opportunity to address this audience.
